Before Edward Snowden released the documents revealing the depth of the National Security Administration’s information-gathering operation — which we all know now as the PRISM program — there was a very different idea of what spying was.

Spying was traditionally reserved for situations in which diplomacy failed and espionage became necessary for national security’s sake. In other words, if the government knows little about a perceived foreign threat and finds that communication is limited or unattainable, then espionage is much more practical than, say, invasion: I’m looking at you, George W. Bush.

After all, the easiest way to impede your enemies is to be one step ahead of them, especially when it comes to terrorism.

The NSA makes this same argument for its espionage practices today. Unlike classic James Bond spy films, the NSA’s practices involve computer data, not explosions, and its enemies are terrorists, not communists. Nonetheless, they claim that the overall goal is the same: national security.

However, I have very serious doubts about the means and the intentions of the PRISM program, as I’m sure countless other global citizens do. In fact, it’s very possible that the United States uses the information to gain an upper hand in the global economy. 

I can grant to the NSA that terrorists are indeed an invisible threat and that this threat requires a vast amount of information in order to unearth it, but there is a specific kind of intelligence that is logically necessary, and I think the NSA’s scope extends far beyond the specifics.

For instance, the documents Snowden leaked revealed that the NSA tapped millions of civilian phone records in the United States. Consequently, the media publicized this information, and for very good reason, because it is seemingly superfluous. Admittedly, however, terrorists have historically concealed themselves as U.S. citizens, so at least the reason for gathering intelligence within the populace is somewhat justified, even if it is a blatant violation of privacy rights.

I’m more skeptical, however, of the reasoning behind spying on the other subjects revealed through the leaked NSA documents. It has recently been disclosed that the NSA was also spying abroad, not just on Iran or on Russia, but on our allies as well. Our very close allies in the war on terror, in fact. Evidently, the NSA had tapped European Union offices and hacked various computer systems in order to gain information. The administration has apparently done the same to 38 different embassies and has spied on various United Nations missions. What has been seemingly most embarrassing for the United States, however, is the fact that the NSA has monitored the private cell phones of 35 world leaders, most notably, Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that activities such as these are “not unusual” in international relations. Perhaps that was true in the Cold War, but in 2013, I find this very unusual. As Merkel put it, “Spying among friends is not on … Trust among friends will now have to be rebuilt.” Trust is essential among allies when it comes to fighting terrorism, simply because cooperation is necessary in combating a universal enemy.

So why was the NSA committing risky activities such as tapping Merkel’s phone? Logically, it doesn’t add up. Germany is just as threatened by terrorism as we are, so how does spying on Germany help us achieve national security? Either this is an extreme case of paranoia or there is some reason other than security for spying on our allies.

This all goes back to something called the Echelon Network, which was revealed by the European Parliament in the late ‘90s. This was a more primitive version of the PRISM data collection program and was allegedly a cooperative effort between the United States and United Kingdom. The network’s primary focus was on international trade and finances. For instance, the U.K.’s MI6 (the British equivalent to the CIA) reportedly placed agents inside the German Budesbank (the German National Bank) in order to track Germany’s financial ins and outs in an attempt to be better equipped to compete economically with the state.

There was also evidence suggesting that the United States spied on a French firm bidding for a contract in Brazil and then passed the information along to an American competitor, allowing the American competition to win the contract. Both of these examples should clarify the intentions of the Echelon Network: to use espionage to cheat the global economy.

What’s concerning is that the NSA’s PRISM program might act simply as an extension of the Echelon Network, and owing to the allegations that PRISM has already spied on oil and energy firms in South America, it doesn’t appear to be too unlikely. All of this phone tapping and bugging of embassies could reflect an American effort to gain the upper hand in trade negotiations, which would also explain why the government has bugged ally embassies in the first place because they are also coincidently economic powerhouses.

The problem here is that espionage for selfish reasons could actually hurt our national security in the long run. We clearly tarnished the relationship we had with our allies after these NSA documents were leaked. Consequently, this could end up hindering future global security efforts, as trust is essential in order for these to work.

Therefore, if we want to take national security seriously, we have to take global cooperation seriously, so limiting or even dismantling the PRISM program might be the best way to regain the trust of our allies.

Write a government-supervised email to Nick at [email protected].