Editorial: U.S. military missed bin Laden

A new Senate report claims that the U.S. military missed a chance to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in 2001. Public enemy No. 1 slipped into Pakistan from the Tora Bora mountains because U.S. soldiers got benched in favor of air strikes and reliance on Afghani intelligence.

The report criticizes the use of too few U.S. soldiers — only about 100 — in surrounding the mountain range filled with almost 2,000 members of al Qaeda and Taliban exiles. In doing so, the report places blame on then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Tommy Franks for underestimating the ingenuity of bin Laden and his followers.

It claims that even a “small, agile force,” such as Green Berets or Army Rangers, might have effectively captured or killed bin Laden, but plans for those assaults were rejected in the chain of command. Rumsfeld did not want more U.S. soldiers in the area because he feared a backlash from Afghani citizens, according to the report.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee officially released the report yesterday, the day before President Obama will give a speech on his new Afghanistan strategy. Releasing it so close to Obama’s speech is akin to a rapper getting arrested immediately prior to releasing an album. It creates buzz and manipulates public opinion to favor the president.

Obama faces growing criticism of the Afghanistan conflict, as well as his handling of it. This report prompts a comparison to former President George W. Bush’s mismanagement of a once-popular war.

The report provides some insights into overconfidence in technology and foreign intelligence, but it risks being perceived as biased. Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., is the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and he requested the report’s preparation. In 2004, he lost an acrimonious presidential election against Bush, in which he repeatedly attacked Bush for the failure to catch bin Laden.

It’s standard politics, but it’s important because, at its core, this entire report is about public perceptions. After 1,520 coalition deaths and more than $300 billion in costs, U.S. citizens question the worth of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Catching bin Laden could have boosted U.S. morale and acted as a significant achievement in a slogging war almost devoid of tangible progress. Maybe the U.S. would have focused on Afghanistan, rather than getting distracted in an unrelated excursion in Iraq.

Then again, maybe killing bin Laden would have metastasized al Qaeda resistance. Terrorist guerillas could have viewed him as a timeless martyr and attracted thousands more to their demented cause. And imagine the public outcry, as well as the al Qaeda celebration, if bin Laden himself were able to kill an approaching U.S. soldier.

Either scenario is speculative.

It’s easy to wish that U.S. troops rid the world of bin Laden when he was so close. Despite the raw emotional impact of merely seeing bin Laden’s picture – similar to seeing Emmanuel Goldstein for a Two Minutes’ Hate session – his capture or assassination would remain pure symbolism.

Bin Laden is not strategically important, though he is a powerful figurehead for both sides of the fight.

The report states, “Removing the al Qaeda leader from the battlefield eight years ago would not have eliminated the worldwide extremist threat.” Nothing will ever completely eliminate that threat, least of all the eradication of one person.

Bin Laden’s symbolic potency should give the government reason enough to study this report and adapt to seize him next time. But unless the U.S. was only interested in symbolically winning, bin Laden’s capture would not have ended the conflict.