Herron: In international politics, image isn’t everything

‘ ‘ ‘ There is a commonly modified and widely interpreted aphorism that states, ‘Nations do not… ‘ ‘ ‘ There is a commonly modified and widely interpreted aphorism that states, ‘Nations do not have friends, they have interests.’ President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, received scrutiny for sharing his belief that ‘the United States of America does not have friends, it has interests.’ ‘ ‘ ‘ With talk of a renewed U.S. image, this observation has become critically relevant. The Obama administration should approach diplomacy with the goal of competency and effectiveness rather than idealism. We must forego the notion of utopian international cooperation in exchange for a much more pragmatic and realistic approach to international relations, and our successes must not revolve around a goal of popular image. They must be substantial and conclusively within our direct and immediate interest. ‘ ‘ ‘ Nation-states do what is in their best interest ‘mdash; militarily or economically ‘mdash; regardless of ideological sentiments. There are exceptions throughout history to be sure ‘mdash; the 1990s contained many ‘mdash; but these lonely exceptions only illuminate the authority of the maxim. ‘ ‘ ‘ History is rife with examples of this behavior: Europe in the middle 18th century. the Balkan wars preceding World War I, the United States and the Soviet Union during and after World War II or U.S. support of Saddam Hussein in the ’80s. These are instances of nations operating as allies with former enemies and vice versa. ‘ ‘ ‘ The climate of international relations is not that of a playground. Nations do not act in consideration of personal affections or grudges. Italy will not snub Germany because Germany talked to Norway, nor will Turkey ally itself with Italy based on the attractiveness of the other’s statesmen. ‘ ‘ ‘ What this all means then is that the U.S. image abroad is immaterial within relations between states. With a new president, there is a temptation to believe that the European powers or other allies will be more willing to work with the United States in order to achieve common goals. Former President George W. Bush has been castigated for tarnishing the U.S. image abroad, and a lack of an international solution to the world’s problems has often been portrayed as Bush’s fault. ‘ ‘ ‘ But this is not true. The problems of reaching international solutions are not based out of any personal animosity but rather by a difference in perceptions. The Iraq war is a prime example of this. ‘ ‘ ‘ Germany, France and the other nations that didn’t participate in the war simply didn’t perceive their security interests in the same way the United States or United Kingdom did. ‘ ‘ ‘ France approached the Iraq war with a grander vision of international relations. Its history ‘mdash; something which greatly influences foreign policy ‘mdash; is full of instances in which a balance of power was seen as the most effective course of action. France, along with Germany, attempted this same balance of power approach to the Iraq war, with a desire to create a stronger EU and a counterweight against the United States. ‘ ‘ ‘ Terrorism, notably, is outside of this approach. Terrorists operate on a much more irrational mentality, one based mostly upon ideology with little regard to self-interest. Blaming Bush’s image or attitude for an intensified terrorist mentality is enticing, but one must recall that Sept. 11 occurred eight months into Bush’s presidency ‘mdash; his image, if it even existed, had yet to materialize. ‘ ‘ ‘ The rage expressed by terrorists was not fostered by Bush’s leadership, but originated in a deeply ingrained ideological difference rooted in differences of religion and values. Expecting terrorism to diminish simply through a change in leadership is dangerously foolish. ‘ ‘ ‘ Diplomatic success then rests in an ability to provide convincing and legitimate arguments that illuminate the benefits of a potential action or pursuit. Bush’s diplomatic failure was that he failed to present an alluring case for an intervention in Iraq. The interests of France and Germany, if they were to be found at all, were not adequately outlined by the Bush administration. ‘ ‘ ‘ The costs of the Iraq war illustrate the folly of directing foreign policy without consideration of direct self-interest. Policies enacted with a desire for the spread of democracy or prevention of future war can be labeled as interest-serving with only tenuous reasoning. Indeed, the same can be said of nations that pursue or avert policies based upon approval ratings or vague concepts of image. ‘ ‘ ‘ The difficulty found in all of this rests in understanding what is and what is not an interest. Finding the correct balance between the extremes of imperialism and isolationism takes creativity and foresight. The determination of when to use force must take into account whether the nation using it will be incontrovertibly better off. E-mail Mason at mph20@pitt.edu.