Since the U.S. and Israel first struck Iran two weeks ago, the war has caused thousands of deaths and economic issues to pile up. 

The war has received a low approval rating from the American public, and many Americans are questioning its goal. Because the context of the war is convoluted for some, Pitt professors help explain the possible reasoning behind Trump’s decision making.

Since the U.S. and Israel carried out their first strikes on Iran two weeks ago, the conflict has seen the deaths of at least 2,000 people in the Middle East, including 13 U.S. service members. The Trump administration has provided changing reasons for the strikes, ranging from Iran’s nuclear weapon buildup and allying with militant groups to hostile reaction to its citizens’ protests.

Ross Harrison, an adjunct associate professor of political science, said he believes a possible cause for the war was the U.S. and Israel’s belief that Iran was not able to solve its own domestic issues, as it killed thousands of demonstrators in December for protesting against its weakening economy. 

“The belief in Washington and in Israel is that Iran is at its weakest point now,” Harrison said. “Its support base in the country is at its lowest point ever, demonstrated by the protests that emerged, which were brutally suppressed.”

Harrison explained that external factors, like Iran’s allies in the Middle East being weakened by internal conflicts, also added to the perceived weakness of the country. Additionally, Harrison said Syria moved away from an alliance with Iran when the regime of Bashar al-Assad fell in December 2024.

“Hamas is obviously not gone, but it’s degraded. Hezbollah — [depending on] how degraded it is because of the current situation — was degraded,” Harrison said. “Syria had moved away from the Iran camp, which was pivotal in a negative way for Iran.” 

Jacob Schiller, teaching assistant professor of political science, said he believes the country’s original hope was that the strikes would lead to similar results to those in Venezuela, when former leader Nicolas Maduro was captured and the new leader was more willing to negotiate with the U.S. However, Schiller said, the U.S. may have miscalculated this and underestimated Iran’s ability to withstand losses to government officials.

“What we’re now seeing is actually a doubling down. We see now that the Ayatollah’s son, whose wife, mother, father and some of his children were killed in the U.S. airstrikes, is now in charge,” Schiller said.

Michael Kenney, the Wesley W. Posvar Chair in International Security Studies and professor of public and international affairs, hypothesized that one of the goals of the war was not to completely wipe out Iran but to eliminate them as a military threat to Israel. 

“I think a lot of Americans would be deeply skeptical of this idea of ‘Here we go again.’ We’re mowing the grass, [and] not even for us — we’re mowing the grass for Israel,” Kenney said.

The White House claimed the initial strikes would allow the Iranian citizens to “seize control of their destiny.” Harrison suggested the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei doesn’t equate to a dismantlement of the Iranian government, unlike how the targeting of Saddam Hussein aided in the collapse of the Iraqi regime.

“The supreme leader is not a dictator. Certainly, this government is authoritarian, but it’s not a dictatorship in the sense that it’s heavily institutionalized. It’s not a personal system,” Harrison said. “Saddam Hussein of Iraq — that was a very personalized system. When [we] cut off the head, the system collapsed. Iran is a different creature.”

Harrison said he believes Iran has a more structured institution than some may think, referencing its elected government led by President Mohammad Khatami and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. He believes the IRGC is currently making key decisions and has a strong hand in choosing the Supreme Leader’s successor.

“It’s kind of like a layered cake in that there are multiple institutions, and it’s built to regenerate itself. That’s what you’re seeing now,” Harrison said. “The Supreme Leader is killed — a new Supreme Leader is chosen. Heads of key security institutions, like the IRDC, are killed, and it regenerates itself.”

According to Harrison, the regime learned from the overthrow of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, drawing on the past to create a government that isn’t easily destroyed.

“They built a system that was less likely to collapse the same way,” Harrison said. “I think most Americans don’t realize that this system is a unique political system in the Middle East.”

Harrison said he is skeptical about the Trump administration’s initial rationale that the strikes would allow for an opposition to succeed the current government after the war, remarking that there is no unified, established opposition.

“The notion that they could bring the regime down and then have people on the ground take over defies any real understanding of how systems can collapse and how political transitions unfold,” Harrison said. “The fact that somehow you can bring down a regime and then, without an organized opposition, take over a system of great complexity just defies the imagination.”

The war has spread into other regions of the Middle East, with Israeli missiles targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran also striking countries with allied ties to the U.S. A stark difference between the two sides, Harrison said, is their allies in the region.

“Most of Iran’s allies have been sub-state actors, non-state actors and militias like Hamas, Palestine and the Hashd al-Sha’bi in Iraq. Whereas, for the United States, our allies include state actors like Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt,” Harrison said. “That’s the big difference — that for the United States, it’s very much a conventional set of military and economic relationships.”

Comparing the Iraq War to the Iran War, Kenney said the U.S. formed a coalition with its allies before striking Iraq and eventually dethroning Saddam Hussein. As for Iran, Kenney said the country’s strategy is very different.

“[In Iraq], we didn’t just thumb our noses at our allies and go in. We built coalitions, alliances of the willing,” Kenney said. “Here, now, it’s different. You have the Trump administration, which for months and months has been thumbing its nose at all our allies. Then when push comes to shove, [he] doesn’t seek to build a coalition.”

This story was updated on March 17 to correct Schiller’s title. The Pitt News regrets this error and remains dedicated to the most accurate news reporting possible.