In May, Afghan authorities locked up Khanzir. The public was scared he might give somebody the H1N1 virus.

It was unlikely that Khanzir was a threat, though. Who would give him the virus in the first place? After all, ever since his domestic partner died two years ago, Khanzir has lived a lonely existence as the only pig in Afghanistan — a country equal in size to Texas minus Massachusetts and Vermont. He lives in the Kabul zoo.

Khanzir is the only pig in Afghanistan because the strict interpretation of Islamic law in most of Afghanistan prohibits the sale of pigs. This is how powerful sharia is in Afghanistan, even eight years after our invasion. On the other side of the Earth, President Barack Obama is considering what to do about more serious threats than H1N1. In the rural areas beyond Khanzir’s zoo, the Taliban is winning.

Unfortunately, the proposed 40,000-soldier surge will not work, because the goals of the troops already in place are too vague. The Taliban will keep winning until we know how things would look if we won.

The U.S. strategy seems more focused on doing things that feel like war than on achieving specified goals. When we send out patrols, just so the patrols can get ambushed and maybe kill a few enemies, we are like people who go to Philadelphia and eat cheese steaks because that feels like a Philly thing to do: Here we are, killing enemies. Feels like a war to me!

Are we trying to kill everyone in the Taliban? That’s not feasible. Are we trying to make the Taliban surrender? It is unclear in what sense the Taliban can surrender. Taliban leaders cannot issue surrender orders without undermining the legitimacy of their own authority.

Therefore, I’m laying out a specified, achievable goal: Maintain peace and order in Kabul and the surrounding Kabul province, where 5 million of the 32 million Afghans live.

Why just Kabul?

First, Kabul is a single city and not a huge one. Controlling Kabul is plausible.

Second, although no one makes it official, the United States is trying to change Afghan culture. For Kabul, this change is not a revolution, but a counterrevolution.

In the 1960s and ’70s, Kabul was called the “Paris of Central Asia.” It was peaceful and rich. Kabuli women were allowed to attend university and even wear what they wanted. Beautiful urban gardens drew tourists from across the world. This era ended because the Soviet Union invaded, and militant Islam was what people needed to stop the Evil Empire — not because Kabulis turned on rationality and the good life.

Third, controlling Kabul would not risk those fiascoes where a plane blows up a wedding party.

Why will this work?

On the combat side, from a base in Kabul province, we could still destroy large-scale threats as they form in the provinces. Air strikes destroyed most of the terrorist training camps within weeks. Also, by taking the focus off the Taliban, U.S. forces could better occupy themselves with defeating al-Qaida — a threat to our own peace and order. The Afghanistan mission could focus on intelligence and excursions that quash threats as they form, rather than playing “Call of Duty” in valleys across Afghanistan.

On the cultural side, the U.S. military would never be able to sow the seeds of a foreign ideology like democracy, but it can provide a rich soil where Afghans can grow their own flavor of democratic values. That soil is a city where property rights are protected and no one lives in fear of physical violence — a city where people can think about investment and enjoyment instead of thinking about surviving this life for rewards in the next.

In a sense, my idea is to make Kabul a larger version of Khanzir — a unique speck of the outside world upon which all Afghans can gaze.

It would happen bit by bit.

First, Kabuli teens will watch YouTube videos, learn foreign languages and play campaigns with Swedes in “World of Warcraft.” Later, parents would consider encouraging careers like engineering to their daughters. As long as peace reigns, nothing can stop the global society from creeping into a city like an H1N1 strand with no vaccine.

Of course, Afghans will fear Kabul at first, just like they fear Khanzir. But there is a mere exposure effect.

Kabulis will get wealthier and freer. The attraction will become too strong. Folks will move into Kabul province or demand liberal reforms in their own regions.

Like the East Germans ripping down the Berlin Wall, Afghans will tear down walls in their own minds.

E-mail Lewis at [email protected].