by Santhosh Chandrashekar The Daily Lobo (U. of New Mexico)

In a speech he delivered… by Santhosh Chandrashekar The Daily Lobo (U. of New Mexico)

In a speech he delivered in Abu Dhabi on Sunday, President Bush reasserted America’s commitment to freedom and the cause of democracy. He cited America’s involvement in Asia, particularly in Japan, which had helped the proliferation of democracy in that country, ostensibly hinting that United States would play the same beneficial role in the Middle East.

But one needs to go back only a few weeks to see the disastrous consequences that Western involvement in Asia has borne. The latest example of a honeymoon with America gone sour is that of Pakistan, whose former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated by a suicide bomber on Dec. 27. Bhutto, who returned to Pakistan after reaching an understanding with President Pervez Musharraf, embodied the hopes of the West of a moderate and enlightened Islamic leader who would support the aspirations of the West.

Before making sense of the circumstances surrounding Bhutto’s assassination, one needs to take into account the West’s involvement in Pakistan under different pretexts and how this stifled democracy.

Pakistan figured prominently in the United States’ scheme of things following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Overnight, Pakistan became a frontline state on the Cold War checkerboard with the United States pumping in funds and arms and offering logistic support to train the Mujaheedin to fight the Russians.

The Cold War era saw Pakistan move closer to the United States and become a recipient of its largesse.

The country was awash with more money and arms that it could possibly handle. It was also during this period that the Pakistani army, which had traditionally undermined civilian authority, found the resources and international support to further suppress democratic processes and emerge as the only stable national institution.

The United States discarded Pakistan from its plans once the Cold War ended without caring to dismantle the elaborate paramilitary infrastructure it had helped set up to fight the Russians. Years later, it was to regret its folly as that same infrastructure helped the Taliban capture power in Afghanistan and set up the first Wahhabi Islamic state in the world. Ironically, this also inaugurated America’s second involvement in Pakistan.

After the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the United States again found it expedient to rope in Pakistan, this time to contain Islamic terrorism and at the cost of supporting a military dictator hugely unpopular at home. While the people of Pakistan had supported U.S. involvement in their country the first time around, they were against Pakistan supporting the United States in its fight against Taliban. This left the United States with the only option of supporting Musharraf, who was ready to do the West’s bidding as long as he would not be pressured to step down in favor of elections to install a democratic regime in Pakistan.

Also, Pakistan had become indispensable for another reason: It was the only Islamic country with nuclear arsenals, and it was imperative that the West assume the guardianship of Pakistan to make sure that the nukes did not fall into the “wrong hands.”

It is in this context that the current political developments in Pakistan must be seen. Apart from strengthening the hands of the Pakistani military establishment, which has a history of suspending democratic processes, the United States is invested in keeping Musharraf in power as a precursor to its own involvement in Afghanistan.

But with the international community calling for an end to Musharraf’s dual role as the civilian as well as military leader of the country, the United States was forced to join the chorus, even as it began work to install a civilian regime that would be conducive to its continuing military involvement in South Asia.

This forced the United States to prevail on Musharraf to arrive at an understanding with Bhutto, who was seen as being less hostile to the United States than Sharif. In terms of electoral politics, it was believed that the Pakistan People’s Party led by Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League led by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain could form a popular front against Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League. But now that Bhutto has been assassinated, such electoral alliances have fallen into disarray along with America’s dream of maneuvering the country to suit its foreign policy needs.

Bhutto’s assassination has revived allegations of Pakistan being a failed nation. The international media have wasted no time in delegitimizing Pakistan, and the neocons who populate the White House may be alternately ruing over their failed plans as well as gloating over how this is another instance of Islam’s incompatibility with democratic values. But such simpleminded understanding of the situation obscures the long-standing involvement of the West in the internal affairs of other countries and the consequences it has borne for democracy.