To the Editor,

The recent column by Mason Herron speaks lengths to the common tendency of a… To the Editor,

The recent column by Mason Herron speaks lengths to the common tendency of a particular subset of Americans to misinterpret the current debate on the relative decline in U.S. hegemony. More so, it conveys the fundamentals of modern U.S. power through an inaccurate and antediluvian lens of analysis. Despite his rant citing militaristic absolutes of U.S. defense spending and growing number of naval bases — mostly in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf ­— the article fails to convey both the repercussions of policies rooted in brute force, as well as the detrimental economic costs.

Where Herron would contest that U.S. power is reflected in the size of its army, many would contend its influence is precisely the opposite. The promise of equal opportunity, individual liberty, a world class education, entrepreneurial success, voice in public affairs and economic opportunity form the basis of U.S. influence that others admire. It has been the historical imperative of regimes considerably less liberal and democratic than the U.S. to compensate for the lack of these opportunities by way of force. Sending the message that maintaining U.S. superiority in the military realm is the sole determinant of continuing its “countless allies” dependency on the nation is both reckless and misleading.

Herron has the bare facts right: The U.S.’s annual defense budget is impressively larger than any other country’s, it’s naval fleet copious and its global show of force painfully obvious. However, his view misunderstands the nature of the U.S. global competitiveness.

The future of U.S. hegemony will depend not on military strength — the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that excessive military spending cannot buy even military success — but on the centrality of the domestic market in global trade. In particular, this includes prudent U.S.-Chinese trade relations, whereby despite pressure from domestic interest groups, protectionism is disliked, as it threatens the fluidity of the U.S. market based on cheaper foreign goods.

Moreover, the symbiotic relationship between the U.S. market for Chinese goods and the Chinese market for U.S. debt must be maintained through mutual self-interest, negotiation and appropriate financial decision making, rather than whose arsenals are the biggest.

No nation can maintain meaningful global influence on financial and economic insolvency, nor will its allies continue to support it based solely on the size of its army. I encourage readers to look beyond the superficialities that make the U.S. the great nation it is.

Ryan Long

School of Arts and Sciences